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III.V Immutable POWER Parameters

List of immutable POWER parameters.

PreviousIII.IV Immutable TTG ParametersNextIII.VI Immutable ZERO Parameters

Last updated 12 months ago

POWER Initial Supply

The initial supply of POWER tokens before any inflation. Set to 1,000,000. Decimals are 0.

Logic: The initial supply of POWER should be sufficient to distribute to the initial holders in the network, but not so high as to cause a premature overflow error. The lack of decimals (and thus lack of subdivision of tokens) was also chosen for this reason. See the diagram under POWER Inflator for further analysis. Another factor to consider in this initial supply is the “dust level,” meaning the level at which in a Reset a ZERO holder would not receive any POWER tokens. For example, since new POWER (post-Reset) is based on existing ZERO balances, anyone who owns less than 1 / POWER Initial Supply of a ZERO token will get 0 POWER after a Reset.

POWER Inflator

The percentage inflation of the POWER supply per active epoch. This occurs only in epochs with a votable proposal, hence why they are referred to as active. If a POWER holder fails to fully participate in an epoch with at least one votable, their balance of POWER tokens will not decrease but their percentage of overall voting power will decrease by 1 / (1 + POWER Inflator). Set to 10%.

Logic: This percentage must sufficiently encourage POWER holder participation without occasional lapses in participation destabilizing the system. At 10% inflation, a POWER holder can expect to lose ~45% of their voting power if not participating for 6 epochs (note that epochs in our implementation correspond roughly to calendar months), ~70% of their voting power if not participating for 12 epochs, and ~90% of their voting power if not participating for 24 epochs. To a lesser extent this number should also take into account a realistic number of epochs with votable proposals to ensure that the operation of the protocol is not impacted by an overflow error. This would require either a Reset or a Hard Fork. The following diagrams demonstrate the intended impact of the POWER Inflator on an inactive participant, and a comparison of POWER Inflator and decimal setting as they impact overflow times assuming a 30-day total epoch time.

Voting power as a percentage of starting voting power (y-axis) over missed epochs with a votable proposal (x-axis), using a 10% POWER Inflator
Years to overflow assuming 12 epochs per year with votable proposals. Comparison of POWER Inflator (left column) and decimal choice for POWER token (top row). Assumes a starting POWER supply of 1,000,000.